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Fiscal asymmetric decentralization is seen as the panacea in solving persistent income 
inequalities facing developing economies. Despite efforts to finance County governments, 
about 42% of Kenyan’s 47.6 million people still live below the poverty level. This study 
evaluates the influence of County fiscal autonomy on household effects in Kenya. Both primary 
and secondary data, collected from households in 47 county governments and the Commission 
on Revenue Allocation, respectively. A Sample of 4,813 households was drawn from 96,251 
lists of households developed by Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Cochran's correction 
formula was used. The result finds an insignificant negative correlation between county fiscal 
autonomy and household effects in Kenya. Further studies are recommended with diverse 
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Fiscal autonomy has been viewed as an enabler in the course of long transformations in 
democratization process of the government and general local government autonomy for a long 
time. This is because the aspect of local government autonomy is considered a very important 
topic in public finance literature particularly in developing countries where majority of people 
live below poverty level, including Kenya. It has been found to positively impact on fiscal 
decentralization process by increasing market size and benefits of decentralized provision of 
public goods especially in Europe (Stegarescu, 2009). World Bank postulates that 95% of 
democracies have transferred their fiscal powers from central level to subnational governments. 
Developed countries that have transferred their fiscal powers include the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Canada (Xie, Zou, & Davoodi, 1999). Other countries where fiscal 
decentralization initiatives are also taking place in developing nations are Mexico, Brazil, 
Bolivia, Belarus, South Africa, and Nigeria. World Bank has supported fiscal decentralization 
trend in developing countries on-premises that fiscal decentralization forms the main part of its 
poverty reduction programs (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2006).  
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Several African countries have decentralized their provision of goods and services from the 
national level to devolved units. This includes Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya (Dickovick & Riedl, 2010). 
The government of Kenya redefined her structure of governance from a unitary system to a 
devolved system in 2010 and entrenched it to the Constitution of Kenya 2010, which created 
47 county governments and a national government (Hope 2014).   From the onset of devolution 
in several fiscal reforms have been done towards the implementation of new Constitution 
including legislative amendments and repealing other Acts of Parliament. Reforms that have 
taken place in Kenya include the provision of public goods and services which is informed by 
Article 201 and regulated by the Public Finance Management Act 2012. The Acts also sets 
principles of management of public service and emphasizes them as a requirement in the budget 
formulation (Hope, 2014).   
 
PFM Act 2012 also creates County Treasury and bestows them with the task of managing 
financial resources and in the creation of own revenue sources. Act postulate that borrowing 
and loan guarantees to County Governments must, however, be authorized by the National 
Assembly. It is within the Powers of County governments to execute its budget by appointing 
qualified and responsible chief officers who are the accounting officers to authorize all 
expenditures, write-off losses, make cash advances and manage assets and liabilities (Mitullah 
& Nguri, 2012). Government of Kenya has been able to maintain a high level of investment 
through domestic financing, for example, the investment gap expanded from about 3.2% of 
GNP in 1965-69 to 6% in the 1980s. The country has come to rely increasingly on external 
resources to finance its capital formation due to the wide budget deficit caused by domestic 
financing. Overall budget deficit increased from 4.9% of GDP in 1969-73 to 9.4% in 1979-83 
and was about 5.0% in 1989- 990, resulting in a policy intervention (Cohen & Hook, 1987).   
 
An aspect of local government autonomy is considered a very aid in the fiscal decentralization 
process especially in the provision of public goods especially in Europe (Stegarescu, 2009). 
Government of Kenya has transferred KShs.1, 459.9 billion in 2012/2013 to Sh3 trillion 
(US$29 billion) in this fiscal year 2019/2020 in an effort to create fiscal autonomy in county 
governments. Despite this effort, 42% of Kenya’s population of 47.6 million people still lives 
below the poverty level of less than one (1) USD per day. Based on the above, this study 
undertook an investigation on the influence of County fiscal autonomy on household effects in 
order to answer the research question whether fiscal asymmetric decentralization influences 
household effects in Kenya. 
2. Literature Review 
Classical theory of fiscal federalism postulates that the transfer of fiscal powers to sub-Fiscal 
autonomy is a key concept in fiscal decentralization literature. Term fiscal autonomy refers to 
the freedom given to sub government levels to perform duties and competencies independently. 
True fiscal decentralization encompasses an expenditure generated from local authorities own 
sources of revenue. Secondly, the central government should allow subnational governments 
to have substantial control over their own revenues generated from set tax rates and/or 
determine the tax base in order to develop their own revenue-raising powers (Oates, 1956). Lu 
& Sun (2013) assert that Local Government Authorities are considered independent when they 
finance their expenditure responsibilities mainly from their own revenues, such as local taxes, 
fees, and revenues from local property. This will make them enable them to make long-term 
financial planning and may improve local government accountability (Psycharis, Zoi, & 
Iliopoulou, 2016). However fiscal autonomy might lead to a conflict of interest and hence 
compromise on the benefits of fiscal autonomy. 
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Smoke (2017) postulate that the theory on fiscal federalism and facts on the ground are 
different. Ensuring that there is adequate subnational revenue is a core concern of fiscal 
decentralization. In this vein, Public finance principles for selecting and designing subnational 
revenue sources have been widely utilized during the prominent wave of decentralization 
efforts in developing countries over the past three decades.  However, available empirical 
literature, suggests that subnational revenue generation often fails to meet needs and 
expectations, even where normative advice has been or seems to have been followed. Total 
expenditure includes all amounts of money that are paid out by a government during its fiscal 
year, normally twelve months, net of recoveries and other correcting transactions other than 
for retirement of debt, purchase of investment securities, extension of loans, and agency or 
private trust transactions (Ball & King, 2006). Argument in favour of fiscal autonomy 
especially concerning revenue generation through external borrowing at local level is not 
without a pinch of salt, considering the debt crisis of subnational governments in Brazil, the 
inflationary impact of subnational financing in Argentina, and the city-level bankruptcies in 
the United States. Above anecdotes caused policymakers to rethink the extent of fiscal 
autonomy due to the possible macroeconomic implications of decentralizing borrowing 
powers. It is argued that problems such as the moral hazard may create unplanned fiscal 
liabilities for central government (Slack, 2017). 
 
This paper is motivated by recent audit reports which indicate that there are numerous instances 
of fraud, wastage and poor accountability in County governments since the inception of 
devolution in Kenya. This is against the backdrop of information that the national government 
has greatly increased funding in the county governments including an equalization fund pegged 
at 15% of the national revenue. Amazingly, there have also been cases of money budgeted for 
development projects being returned to the National treasury at the end of the fiscal year. 
Further, uncertainty exists on the negative correlation between the total development budget 
that is disbursed and is spent and the level of development, poverty prevalence or access to 
essential services (Kruk et al., 2017).  Tokuoka & White (2017) define a household as a unit 
consisting of one or more people who live in the same dwelling and also share meals or living 
accommodation. This may consist of a single-family or some other grouping of people. 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
3. Research Methods 
Population in this paper consists of households domiciled in 47 county governments in Kenya. 
A Sample of 4,813 households was drawn from the 96,251 lists of households used by the 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics in the 2009 enumeration areas by use of the Cochran's 
(1977) correction formula. Study made use of both primary and secondary data. Primary data 
was collected through the use of a household interview schedule while County fiscal data was 
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sources from the Commission of Revenue Allocation and the National Treasury. Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression model was used to establish the association between the 
independent and dependent variables. Regression analysis was done using STATA (version 
14) software. The regression model used is as follows: 
 
Y= β0 +β1X1 + ε………………………………………….. (1) 
Y= β0 +β1X1 + ε………………………………………….. (2) 
Where: 
Y  = Dependent variable (Household effects) 
X1 = County Fiscal Autonomy 
Βi is parameters and ƹ is the error term 
P-value at 95% confidence level was used to determine the statistical significance of the 
constant terms coefficient terms β1. The coefficient of determination R2 was used to determine 
how much variation in the dependent variables as is explained by the independent variables. 
Data were presented using tables and graphs where applicable for clarity and ease of 
understandability. Hypothesis to test whether fiscal autonomy has any influence on Household 
Effects was as follow: 
Ho: β1 = 0 (There is no correlation between County Fiscal Autonomy and household effects). 
H1: β1 ≠ 0 (There is a correlation between County Fiscal Autonomy and household effects). 
4. Results 
Study collected both primary and secondary data sets. Secondary data related to the 47 County 
governments. Fiscal data ranging between 2012/ 2013 and 2017/ 2018 fiscal Years was sourced 
from the Commission on Revenue Allocation and the National Treasury. Primary data was 
collected through a household survey by use of interview schedules. Household survey was 
adopted and conducted based on a population of 96,251 households drawn from the 
enumeration areas (EAs) prescribed by NASSEP V methodology as applied in Kenya 
Household Survey of 2013 by Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS). A sample size of 
4813 households was selected by use of Cochran’s (1977) correction formula, of these 
households, 2480 were successfully interviewed, yielding to an overall household response rate 
of 51 percent. Deviation was primarily due to the new structures occupied by the time of survey 
that was not initially occupied in the first visit in urban areas, while the gated community-style 
of residence proved difficult to access in some urban areas like in the City’s upper market 
villas. Young families were seldom absent. In the rural areas, the terrain like in Muranga and 
some parts of Meru County were also difficult to access, while the researcher faced security 
concerns in some parts of the country, hence limiting the responses from the initial target group. 
According to Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2007), a 30 to 40% response is considered as 
adequate in a survey, while Sekaran (2003) postulate 30%. Hager, Wilson, Pollack & Rooney 
(2003) however recommend 50%. Based on these arguments, the response rate of 51% 
achieved in this study is therefore considered adequate. 
 
Demographic Characteristics of households 
Study sought to understand the respondents and representativeness of the sample. This was 
done by posing questions on some information relating to the respondent's gender, age, marital 
status, and the level of education of the household heads. This study is of the view that 
demographic characteristics of household are important in order to obtain a more complete 
representation of the social embeddedness of an individual, hence it is necessary to add further 
household characteristics like the household's education level, age and the household's head 
marital status. Other studies have shown that income differs depending on a person's age and 
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gender. The studies have also established that income varies between men and women and 
during the life cycle. It is therefore imperative to consider the effects of demographic 
characteristics such as age and gender when seeking an explanation into the causes of 
household income inequalities (Etingoff, 2016). The findings on the characteristic of the 
sample are presented in Table 1.  
 
First question was on the gender of the household head. Demographic characteristics include 
gender, generation, race and ethnicity, education, geographic region, and marital status of the 
respondents. Results in Table 1, reveal that 69.6% of the household heads were men while 
30.4% were women. This implies that majority of the households are headed by men.  
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Households 
Gender of Household Heads N Min. Max. Mean Std.Dev Percent 
Male 1726 - - - - 70 
Female 254 - - - - 30 
Education level 
Primary 
670 - - - - 27 
Secondary 1280 - - - - 51.6 
Bachelors 248 - - - - 10 
Post graduate 282 - - - - 11.4 
Age - 20 76 42.55   
Source: Data analysis 
Results in Table 1 indicate that 70 percent of the respondents were male while 25 percent were 
female. 5 percent did not respond to the researcher's interview schedule. This study abides with 
the United Nation (UN) 2013 policy document, which emphasizes gender sensitivity on all 
household survey. This study, therefore, meets the standard set by the UN Inter-Agency and 
Expert Group on Gender Statistics (IAEG-GS) and Kenya's vision 2030 which also emphasize 
on mainstreaming gender sensitivity in all government programs (Un & Sahin, 2012). 
Effect of County fiscal Autonomy on Household Effect (Household Income) 
Study sought to establish the causation that exists between fiscal autonomy and household 
effects using household income indicator.  To this end, the study runs an OLS regression model 
whose result is presented in Table 2 and 3 respectively.  
Table 2. Regression Model: County Fiscal Autonomy and Household Income outcome 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
County fiscal autonomy -0.30043 0.619993 -0.48 0.629 
_cons 1.659817 0.488625 3.4 0.001 
R square 0.0017    
Adj. R square -0.0055    
F (1, 139) 0.23    
Prob.>F .6287    
Skewness/Kurtosis test    Chi2=55.90, Prob> chi2=0.000 
Breusch-Pagan test        Chi2=0.25, Prob> chi2=0.6182 
Wooldridge test             F(1, 46) =0.177, Prob>F  = 0.6758 
Source: STATA output 
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Results indicate that there is no significant relationship between county fiscal autonomy and 
household effects. This is indicated by a p-value of 0.6287 at 5% level of significance. Results 
imply that fiscal county dependence does not have a significant effect on household income. 
Skewness/Kurtosis test indicates that the data was not normally distributed since the probability 
value is less than 0.05. However, normality was assumed since the number of observations was 
large. Breusch-Pagan test reported a p-value of 0.6182, which is greater than 0.05 and hence 
the data was homoscedastic. Further, Wooldridge test reported a p-value of 0.6758, which is 
greater than 0.05 and therefore, there was no autocorrelation. Study found that there is a weak 
negative relationship between county fiscal autonomy and household effects. This is supported 
by a correlation coefficient of -0.0307. However, the association between the two variables is 
insignificant at 5% level of significance. Findings imply that a change in county fiscal 
autonomy would negatively change household effects, though to a small extent.  
 
Further, the findings reveal that there is a weak negative relationship between county fiscal 
autonomy and household health. This is supported by a correlation coefficient of -0.0307. 
However, the association between the two variables is insignificant at 5% level of significance. 
Findings imply that a change in county fiscal autonomy would negatively change household 
health, though to a small extent.  This result agrees with Bergh and Henrekson (2011) findings 
that a negative relationship between public actual expenditure and household income 
inequalities exist in OECD countries. Likewise, a recent study by Fall and Fournier (2015), 
confirms that a negative relationship between the size of government and GDP growth also 
exist. 
 
Effect of County Fiscal Autonomy on Household Effect (Household Income) 
Further, Table 3 indicates the result of the relationship between county fiscal autonomy and 
household health outcome.   
Table 3. Household Effects and Household Health Indicator 
 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
County fiscal autonomy  -0.34374 0.949112 -0.36 0.718 
_cons 2.372078 0.748009 3.17 0.002 
R squared 0.0009    
Adj. R squared -0.0062    
F (1, 139) 0.13    
Prob.>F 0.7178    
Source: STATA output 
Study finds that there is no significant relationship between county fiscal autonomy and 
household effects when household health is used as an indicator. This is indicated by a p-value 
of 0.718 at 5% level of significance. This implies that county fiscal autonomy does not have a 
significant effect on household health.  One of the setbacks on the gains of fiscal autonomy in 
Nigeria is the incursion of the military in Nigerian government and politics. This has resulted 
to a contraction in fiscal space from the regional governments to the central government 
resulting to substantially reduced power and independence of the federating units which is 
inimical to the goal of nation-building in plural Nigeria (Ejikeme, 2012). 
 
In Kenya, it has been found that county government's Own-source revenue contributed 13 
percent of the total County Governments receipts in the first three years of devolution, while 
transfers from the National Government accounted for more than 84 percent. On the other hand, 
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economic growth in the same governments dropped from 18.8 percent between FY 2013/14 
and 2014/15 to 3.1 percent between FY 2014/15 and 2015/16. This casts aspersions on the 
success of fiscal autonomy in meeting its goal in tandem with the theory of fiscal federalism's 
viewpoint in improving the welfare of local citizens and the resource dependence theory (Oak, 
1956). 
5. Conclusion and Recommendation 
This study provides new evidence on county fiscal autonomy on own revenue source and 
household income as indicators of the relation between fiscal asymmetric decentralization and 
household effects. This study has analyzed the dichotomy in financing devolved government 
services. But the study has also found other literature that supports the fact that decentralization 
ought to be carried out in a continuum. However, where there exist several political parties in 
a coalition, pressure to devolve functions also exist which disrupt the prior arranged modus 
operadi of devolution of government functions, resulting in a dichotomous nature. Kenya is 
not left out on this. During the study period, there have been numerous reports of 
misappropriation of government's funds at County levels on one hand, while Kenya has also 
reduced in the World ranking on corruption perception index. This study, therefore, concludes 
that though there has been increased county funding by the national government in Kenya, it 
is possible that the same has not been utilized for the intended purpose. The government should, 
therefore, enhance monitoring and evaluation of County governments and introduce other 
methods of budget implementation and oversight.   
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